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Time in Archaeology: 
An Introduction 
SIMON HOLDAWAY AND LuANNWANDSNIDER 
University of Auckland and University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lifeway reconstruction is listed as one of the objec-
tives of "World Prehistory," the ubiquitous course 
taught in universities and colleges the world over 
(e.g., Fagan 1995:8). It complements well the other 
subdisciplines of anthropology, at least for begin-
ning anthropology students, offering them a fa-
miliar approach to foreign material: if cultural 
anthropologists study the behavior of present-day 
(or at least near-to-present-day) peoples, then ar-
chaeologists may be expected to deal with peoples' 
behavior from the past. Certainly, some archaeol-
ogists study the past aided by textual records, and 
some cultural anthropologists are interested in 
past historical experience. But this overlap only 
enhances the perceived integration of approaches. 
The clear message is that archaeology is about do-
ing the ethnography of the past. 
The problem is that our cultural anthropology 
colleagues have changed the way they do ethnog-
raphy. The postmodernist critique has laid bare 
the fictive nature of the objective anthropological 
experience. Ethnographies tell a story from a par-
ticular point of view that is only one of a range of 
understandings of why things happen. What, then, 
is the status of the archaeologists' lifeways recon-
struction? To some, particularly the more radical 
members of the postprocessual archaeology of the 
1980s, all archaeological reconstruction was seen as 
theory dependent and therefore subjective. Life-
way reconstruction, therefore, was held to reflect as 
much about the society from whence the archaeol-
ogist originated as it reflected a reality experienced 
by people in the past. And from the late twentieth 
century, the indigenous voice can be added. No 
longer do archaeologists have a monopoly on ex-
plaining what went on in the past. There are com-
peting views and multiple lifeway reconstructions. 
As archaeologists, we are being openly challenged 
to defend the veracity of our reconstructions (e.g., 
Bender 2002). 
The postprocessual critique has been well re-
hearsed in a variety of monographs and edited 
essay collections, and we do not intend to add this 
volume to the stack. Rather, the authors collected 
herein wish to address the question of meaning in 
the past from a different tack, one that we develop 
by taking inspiration from articles written in the 
early 1980s by Bailey, Binford, and others grouped 
here under the term time perspectivism. As Bailey 
defines the term in chapter 2, time perspectivism 
treats all archaeological material records as palimp-
sests and asserts that there is a relationship between 
the scale at which such records can be resolved and 
the types of research questions they can be used to 
answer. 
That different explanations of the past are pos-
sible depending on the temporal scale at which 
past human behavior is viewed is hardly a new 
point or one that has been cast aside since Bailey 
and Binford published their seminal papers (e.g., 
Rarnenofsky 1998). Other theoretical approaches 
such as historical ecology (e.g., Balee 1998) and 
Annaliste treatments (e.g., Bintliff. ed. 1991; Knapp 
1992) have insisted on multiscalar views of the past. 
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What sets time perspectivism apart from other ap-
proaches, however, is the insistence on readings 
of the archaeological record as a unique historical 
data set on which to base multiple scales of explana-
tion. It is the rise of formation studies over the Jast 
30 years that has provided the means to view the ar-
chaeological record in this way. The authors of this 
volume seek explanations of the past that conform 
to our understanding of how the archaeological 
record was formed while at the same time dealing 
with deposits as palimpsests and seeking explana-
tions that are scale dependent. 
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
If archaeological explanations are to be taken seri-
ously, on a par with, rather than replacing, other 
kinds of explanations of the past, then we need to 
be clear how our explanations are derived from the 
archaeological record. Archaeologists have spent 
a great deal of effort searching the theoretical lit-
erature to learn what drives humans to act the way 
they do. Much of this searching has ranged across 
the social sciences, often delving into studies con-
ducted over the short term, using observational 
scales rarely exceeding the lifetime. To what extent 
do these studies actually engage the content of the 
archaeological record? 
The need to show that archaeology may be 
used to study the same types of phenomena as 
those studied by social scientists when dealing with 
contemporary peoples seems to have largely over-
taken the need to answer this question. As Yoffee 
and Sherrat (1993) comment, archaeology alone 
among the social sciences has failed to build its 
own social theory. The contemporary social the-
ory of other disciplines, first seen as a source for 
explanatory inspiration, has in some cases become 
a prescription for how archaeology should be un-
dertaken. Shennan (1989 ), when retrospectively re-
viewing the impact of Binford and Binford's New 
Perspectives in Archeology (1968) and Clarke's Ana-
lytical Archaeology (1968), makes it clear that this 
charge is not unique to postprocessual archaeol-
ogy. New Archaeology's initial interest in culture 
process rapidly gave way to interests in social, eco-
logical, economic, and ideological processes, isolat-
ing what to Clarke was unique about archaeology. 
2 
To be sure, archaeologists have kept up with and 
adopted many of the advances in social theory. But 
in seeking to make archaeology relevant, they have 
in many instances left the archaeological record be-
hind. Archaeologieal explanation is often treated 
as just another form of social explanation, the dif-
ficulty of which should immediately be obvious to 
someone standing in front of a midden, eroding 
house wall, or deflated hearth. The danger archae-
ologists face is that in failing to emphasize the ar-
chaeological nature of our perspective on the past 
and our perspective on explanation, archaeology 
will fast become an irrelevance (van der Leeuw and 
Redman 2002). Why should indigenous people or 
anyone else consider our explanations as valid in 
their own terms, if we couch them in contempo-
rary social theory while failing to convey that the 
archaeological basis for explanation is quite differ-
ent from that provided by contemporary "human 
time" (Stein 1993) observation? 
Of course there are exceptions to the blanket 
criticisms made in the paragraphs above. Some ar-
chaeolOgists have considered the relationship be-
tween the formation of the archaeological record 
and the nature of archaeological explanation. The 
authors in this volume draw inspiration from a se-
ries of essays by Geoff Bailey (1981, 1983, 1987) 
published in the early 1980s and a series of essays 
published by Lewis Binford (1977a, 1978a, 1980, 
1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1983a) during the same time pe-
riod. Bailey (2007, this volume [ch. 2]) has pro-
vided his own introduction to the genesis of his 
ideas. Similarly, Murray pur~ues the intellectual tra-
jectories of time perspectivism in chapter II, using 
the term introduced by Bailey. Murray (1999a) has 
also recently written on Binford and time within 
the context of the "Pompeii premise" debate with 
Michael Schiffer. 
Despite the lingering interest in time perspec-
tivism by Murray and others, it must be said that 
both Bailey and Binford ultimately failed to pro-
vide programmatic statements that inspired a' new 
body of research, something that Bailey addresses 
in this volume. What their work lacked was a clear 
method for implementing the theoretical insights 
they developed. There are therefore two objectives 
for this book: to demonstrate that the problems 
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identified in the early literature have not gone away 
and to illustrate, through a series of case studies 
presented in the chapters that follow, a set of meth-
ods that can be applied to overcome these problems 
and thereby reinstate time perspectivism in the 
agenda of archaeological theoretical discourse. 
In this introduction, we review time perspectiv-
ism and provide a brief intellectual history of time 
in archaeology, indicating why we have brought to-
gether a group of authors to talk about their ideas 
for an archaeological concept of time derived from 
formation studies of the archaeological record. In 
so doing, we provide an introduction to the chap-
ters that make up this volume, as well as illustrating 
in a little more depth our reaction to the topic of 
lifeways with which we ~pened. 
TIME PERSPECTIVISM 
Time perspectivism was formulated around the 
idea that observations made at different temporal 
scales differentially make different processes appar-
ent. Applied to the archaeological record, time per-
spectivism provides an alternative to the view that 
the vagaries of preservation provide for only an in-
complete account of past ("human time" [Stein 
1993]) behavior (Bailey 2007, this volume). Bailey, 
Binford, and Foley (198Ia, 1981b, 1981c) indepen-
dently developed variations on this idea at much 
the same time. It was clear to all three scholars that 
archaeological deposits in the main represent the 
remains of repeated events and therefore offer the 
opportunity of studying processes operating at 
temporal scales longer than an event (e.g., Bailey 
1981; Binford 1981a; Foley 198Ia). 
But what was less clear was how this observation 
could be applied to archaeological remains. Both 
Bailey (1983) and Binford (1977a) were interested 
in what they termed methodological (or concep-
tual) uniformitarianism. If stone artifacts or ani-
mal carcasses are reduced in nonrandom ways and 
can be shown to have clear material signatures iden-
tifiable over the short term, and if a methodolog-
ical uniformitarianism based on the observations 
can be sustained, then archaeological relation-
ships can be interpreted (see also DeBoer and Lath-
rap 1979). This was clear enough in the late 1970S 
and 1980s. But while archaeological deposits rep-
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resent individual items accumulated at the time of 
manufacture, construction, and initial use, they are 
also reflective of the reuse and redeposition of arti-
facts as well as the reoccupation of places by a va-
riety of peoples for a variety of purposes. Features, 
for example, show the accumulation of instances 
of refurbishment, destruction, and reconstruc-
tion (M. E. Smith 1989), whereas artifacts may be 
reduced through wear or resharpening, acquir-
ing traces that reflect their use-life histories (sensu 
Sullivan 1978). The studies that emphasize the sig-
nificance of these processes for interpreting ar-
chaeological materials have largely developed since 
Bailey's, Binford's, and Foley's seminal essays. These 
studies have allowed a new generation of archaeol-
ogists to develop methods that allow the applica-
tion of time perspectivist ideas. 
Most archaeologists would accept the impor-
tance of site and artifact reuse, but although eth-
noarchaeological studies are widely directed at 
investigating the manufacture, use, and abandon-
ment of artifacts and features, when such use-lives 
are considered at all, they are, rather ironically, of-
ten synthesized to construct long-term conditions 
that show little or no temporal change. The various 
strategies-mobility, technological, settlement, or-
ganizational, behavioral-that archaeologists in-
creasingly turn to as explanatory devices (Hegmon 
2003; Holdaway and Wandsnider 2006) are typi-
cal examples. These strategies invariably take sta-
bility over some span of time as a given. The great 
time depth offered by archaeology is often vaunted 
(e.g., Hodder 2001, introducing Mithen 2001 and 
Meskell20OI). Apart from an extension or refine-
ment 'of the chronometry of human prehistory, 
however, the outline of significant events in gen-
eral archaeology has changed little over the decades 
since the radiocarbon "revolution" (Dunnell 1982). 
Much explanation continues to be, in Dunnell's 
terms, proximate and functional and, therefore, 
timeless. Despite a wider range of tools with which 
to assess the palimpsest-like nature of the archae-
ological record that Bailey and Binford discussed, 
little progress has been made in understanding 
how the life histories of the artifacts and features 
that form such a palimpsest might influence the na-
ture of archaeological inference and therefore the 
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ultimate goals of an archaeological interpretation 
of historical processes. 
THE TAPHONOMIC 
METAPHYSIC 
Paynter (2002), correctly in our view, argues that, 
whatever the original goals of the New Archae-
ology, its application quickly descended into a 
synchronic, functionalist interpretation of the ar-
chaeological record. Nevertheless, there remain 
several developments in the archaeological litera-
ture beginning in the early 1970S that either directly 
or indirectly addressed the status of the archaeolog-
ical record as a medium through which to develop 
historical explanations. We believe that, viewed 
with the hindsight of history , these studies, though 
never forming a recognizable alternative to the pro-
cessual and postprocessual bodies of literature, are 
sufficiently coherent to be labeled the taphonomic 
or formational metaphysic and provide a method-
ological door through which time perspectivism 
can be approached. 
This metaphysic began to cohere, we suggest, 
with publication of Michael Schiffer's (1972) semi-
nal article on archaeological and systemic context. 
Here, Schiffer effectively promoted the study of 
the archaeological record and, with his colleagues, 
subsequently went on to develop behavioral ar-
chaeology (Reid et al. 1975). The behavioral ar-
chaeologists extended archaeological research to 
explain the full breadth of relationships between 
human behavior and material culture in all times 
and places (Schiffer 1995:ix). Although Schiffer 
was criticized for attempting lifeway reconstruc-
tion (Binford 198Ia), albeit from a perspective that 
offered a detailed consideration of nonfunctional 
sources of variation (Murray 1999a), behavioral ar-
chaeology emphasized Cartesian time in a way that 
had few precedents. Cartesian views of time as-
sume that objects have both a position in space and 
a trajectory through time independent of other ob-
jects. Behavioral archaeologists reflected this view 
by studying artifact life histories and describing the 
complex ways artifacts moved back and forth from 
Schiffer's systematic and archaeological contexts 
through time (e.g., DeBoer 1974). From this came a 
much better understanding of the temporal prop-
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erties of the archaeological record (the way various 
time-dependent processes are responsible for arti-
fact deposition) and ultimately a much greater un-
derstanding of the kinds of questions that may be 
asked of this record and the kinds of explanations 
of the human past it supports. 
The temporality of deposits formed a key as-
pect in Clarke's (1973) well-known exposition 
of the New Archaeology in Britain, a statement 
picked up by Sullivan (1978, 1995a) in the United 
States. Equally important was an early essay by Isaac 
(1972) wherein he suggested that the long time 
depth represented in the Paleolithic record might 
require a different type of explanation than the cul-
ture histories being written for more recent peri-
ods. Binford (198Ia), Foley (198IC:8-9), and others 
followed these leads, arguing that patterns in arti-
fact densities are a product of repetitive behaviors 
maintained over long time periods reflecting stable 
configurations of humans, artifacts, and the land 
surface and emphasizing the taphonomic nature of 
archaeological deposits through studies of the var-
ious ways in which objects accumulate. For Foley 
(198Ib:173), all archaeological deposits are palimp-
sests that vary only in the scale at which they may be 
interpreted. His (1981C:180) off-site approach was 
directed at providing spatial rather than chrono-
logical information relating to past behavior, with 
the aim of understanding long-term land use in re-
lation to resource distribution. 
Binford's theoretical interests were directed 
slightly differently. In the now famous article in-
troducing foragers and collectors, he (1980) re-
lated the development of palimpsest deposits with 
different histories to different types of mobility 
among hunter-gatherers. Specialized versus gener-
alized palimpsests were discussed with reference to 
the Mask site (Binford 1978a) as well as Nunamiut 
seasonal camps (Binford 1978b). In addition, Bin-
ford's understanding of the archaeological record 
is clear from two further concepts. First, he (1978a, 
1978b, 1980) discussed the temporal significance 
of geomorphological processes of archaeological 
site formation by using the concept of the tempo-
ral grain of deposits, the degree to which behavioral 
events might be resolved within a deposit. Second, 
he (198Ib) introduced the concept of historical 
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integrity to describe the similarities and differences 
in the conditions that led to the formation of an ar-
chaeological deposit. These studies culminated in 
what might be described as a landscape perspec-
tive using the "rocks with eyes" analogy (Binford 
1983a). For Binford (1982, 1983a), archaeological 
deposits result from the actions of many genera-
tions of individuals, all of whom abandoned arti-
facts and features as epiphenomena of a collective 
long-term behavioral system in which they were in-
volved, the definition of which forms the goal of 
archaeology. 
Extensions of this landscape perspective by 
other authors quickly followed, with the intro-
duction of the term place use histories to describe 
the differing sequences of deposition and differ-
ent geographic locations (Camilli 1983, 1988; Ca-
milli et al. 1988; Sullivan 1992a; Wandsnider 1998). 
Dewar and McBride (1992) discussed remnant set-
tlement patterns and introduced the concepts of 
spatial contiguity and temporal continuity to dis-
cuss place occupation through time. Kelly (1988), 
in following these ideas, uniquely included geolog-
ical criteria such as surface deflation and stability in 
his attempts to describe depositional history. 
It was Stern (1993, 1994a), however, who most 
clearly articulated the relationship among deposi-
tional history, time averaging as described in the 
geological (paleontological) literature, and obser-
vations on time perspectivism offered by Bailey 
(1981,1983,1987; see also Bailey 2007; Murray 1997, 
1999a, 2002). For Stern, the archaeological record 
is to be seen as a time-averaged material sample of 
the remains of past human activity. Like many pale-
ontological deposits, time-averaged archaeological 
deposits are formed over prolonged periods of time 
such that items (artifacts or fossil organisms) found 
within a single deposit may originate from a variety 
of different cultural systems (or habitats ).In apply-
ing these concepts, Stern elaborated on Binford's 
notion of historical integrity, noting the time-
averaged nature of fluvial deposits from Koobi Fora 
that incorporated materials derived from a variety 
of landscape features with different temporalities. 
Because of the temporal complexity of the depos-
its, Stern argued that many of the high-resolution 
behavioral, that is, "lifeways," interpretations of ar-
chaeological deposits with hominid remains and 
artifacts are inappropriate. 
Not only must the temporality of the interpre-
tation be matched to the temporality of the deposit, 
but time-averaged deposits do not represent an av-
erage in time (see de Lange, this volume; Stern, this 
volume). It is not a question of trying to match a 
single behavioral scenario to explain the formation 
of an archaeological deposit. Rather, time-averaged 
deposits are better thought of as the summation of 
materials derived from a variety of behaviors and 
contexts. Thus, lifeway reconstructions cannot be 
made as though materials derive from an "average" 
of behavior. 
In treating the archaeological record as a time-
averaged sample composed of items that do not nec-
essarily share a common depositional history, Stern 
espoused a view of the archaeological record close 
to that advocated by geoarchaeologists (as well as 
some others). DeBoer (1983), for instance, drew a 
parallel between archaeology and paleontological 
taphonomic studies, arguing that the complexity 
of formation processes would disallow an isomor-
phism between the archaeological and systemic 
contexts. Stein (1987) proposed that archaeological 
deposits should be seen as an aggregate of sedimen-
tary particles, each particle having its own partic-
ular history. According to this view, the record is 
an accumulation of separate particle histories, only 
some of which are the result of a single process. 
Dunnell (1992) commented favorably on this ap-
proach while promoting his evolutionary view of 
archaeology and drawing a contrast between func-
tional ecological explanations and historical expla-
nations of how things come to be (Dunnell 1980). 
For Dunnell (1982), materialist approaches to his-
torical causation offer the only hope for a truly 
evolutionary archaeology. In what he described 
as a time-like reality, things are always in the pro-
cess of becoming, and relations between observa-
tions are dependent on both time and place. Thus, 
the goal of evolutionary archaeology continues to 
be not an understanding of the archaeological re-
cord as a series of essentially timeless behavioral 
scenarios but, rather, to seek cause in the selection 
of attributes from a pool of continuous variation. 
For many, whereas the explanatory framework of 
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evolutionary archaeology seems overly restrictive 
(but see Shennan 2002), a materialist rather than 
essentialist metaphysic has much appeal. Ramenof-
sky (1998), for instance, has discussed the need to 
match the temporal scale at which a research ques-
tion is pitched with the data observed at an appro-
priate scale. She argues that a materialist view is 
most consistent with such a multiscale approach. 
As referenced above, those who follow the 
Braudelian Annales scheme see virtue in searching 
for conjunctures, the interaction of processes that 
occur over the short term (involving individuals 
and events), the medium term (periods spanning 
socioeconomic and demographic cycles), and the 
long term (environmental changes [Bintliff 2004 D. 
Smith (1992), in discussing the Annales approach, 
links the Braudelian scheme to Butzer's (1982) con-
figuration of ecology and systems theory, thereby 
overcoming Braudel's static view of the environ-
ment. Like Braudel, Smith sees the interaction of 
processes operating at these different scales as criti-
cal for interpreting the past. For Smith, however, 
the distinction between the essentialist and materi-
alist metaphysic discussed above is something of a 
red herring. Smith argues that periodization is un-
avoidable because it is not possible to study contin-
uous change. Therefore Smith feels that chronology 
poses methodological rather than theoretical prob-
lems and is best addressed by refining chronology 
into as small a set of units as possible, the equivalent 
of Braudel's short-term events. 
On its own the identification of short-scale 
events in the archaeological record is not problem-
atic. Lucas (2005:48), for instance, argues persua-
sively that these are manifest in the deposition of 
single artifacts and burials. But where both Lucas 
and Smith fail is in their inability to demonstrate 
how the time-averaged nature of the archaeological 
record is to be addressed when these events are com-
bined into assemblages. Whereas short-term events 
may be easily defined, the medium- and long-term 
patterns are only manifest at the assemblage level, 
defined according to Stern (1994a, this volume) by 
the minimum chronological resolution of the de-
posit as a whole. It is not at all clear how these pat-
terns are formed from the individual events that 
accumulate to form the assemblage and therefore 
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how they may be interpreted using conventional 
social theory. The problem that both Smith and 
Lucas face is made clear by Blake's (2003) analysis 
of Byzantine-era reuse of Sicily's prehistoric rock-
cut tombs. Rather than giving an explanation for 
the reuse of these sites based on an attempt by the 
Byzantine-era people to identify with a prehistoric 
past (and hence the medium to long term), Blake ar-
gues that "this phenomenon of reuse resulted from 
a fortuitous convergence of the older site's famil-
iar presence and new pan-Mediterranean cultural 
currents" (2003:218). In this case, documentary ev-
idence is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of a 
link between the short and medium to long term; 
however, the situation is not always this clear. The 
temptation is always to stretch the linkages and 
construct a narrative account that forges links be-
tween temporal scales without sufficiently demon-
strating their presence or, indeed, as Blake was able 
to do, their absence. 
ANTHROPOLOGY, 
ARCHAEOLOGY, AND TIME 
Anthropologists are interested in the temporality 
implied in telling time. "Going slow" does not just 
mean working less quickly but has a definite social 
implication as well (Munn 1992). The classic time 
questions in anthropology refer to the social con-
ceptualization of time (GellI992). Recent essays 
edited by Karlsson (2001) and by Gingrich and col-
leagues (2002), for instance, discuss a variety of ap-
proaches to time. Artelius (2001) considers Viking 
conceptualizations of time, relating these to Viking 
resistance to Christianity and its foreign temporal 
concepts. Damm (2001) comments on the disjunc-
ture between the timeless traditional stories of the 
Bugakhwe of Botswana and the new, historical sto-
ries they now recognize as being necessary to argue 
claims to land. Schieffielin (2002) provides exam-
ples on linguistic usages that deliver temporal sig-
nals, and Paynter (2002) investigates time in terms 
of the various narratives told about a particular 
place. Bender (2002) discusses landscapes as a mul-
tivocal entity associated with different views of the 
historical past. 
A few archaeologists have taken their lead from 
studies like these and investigated aspects of time 
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that are specific to certain cultures and worldviews 
(e.g., chapters in Murray, ed. 1999; see also Lucas 
2.005 and van Dyke and Alcock 2.003 on the archae-
ology of memory). Bradley (1998, 2.005) has devel-
oped the archaeology of time in a slightly different 
direction focusing on monuments. Using a distinc-
tion made by Rowlands (1993) between memories 
in the form of monuments as inscriptions versus 
memories that are incorporated through the use of 
monuments (i.e., through practice), he (1998:90) 
argues that despite the acknowledged imprecision 
of archaeological chronologies, regularities exist in 
the archaeological record because societies main-
tained rituals over long periods of time. More re-
cently Bradley (2.0os:chapter 7) has developed this 
idea using Renfrew's (2.001) claim that the major 
change in human society occurred not with the ad-
vent of modern humans but with the beginnings of 
sedentary life. For Bradley, the shift from hunting-
gathering to the sedentary exploitation of domestic 
plants and animals marked a fundamental change 
in the nature of the archaeological record, one that 
is manifest both in the nature of ritual practice and 
in the creation of more temporally stable patterns 
in the archaeological record compared with the re-
cord created by hunter-gatherers. 
Whether or not the record of hunter-gatherers 
is truly different from that of those with a domes-
ticated economy is of course open to debate, but 
from a time perspectivist position the worry is that 
the apparent stability and relative ease of interpre-
tation of the record of sedentary peoples are an arti-
fact of the presence of long-lived structures and the 
temptation to interpret activity in relation to these 
structures in synchronic terms. In much the same 
way that the hunt for disjuncture in the Annales ap-
proach promotes seamless transtemporal narrative 
(e.g., Bintliff 2.004) rather than interrogation of 
such (ida Blake 2.003), it is very tempting to look, for 
instance, for activity zones within a house structure 
that has a longevity measured in decades or more. 
Patterns that appear are, of course, the outcome of 
palimpsest deposits and therefore little different 
from the medium-term accumulation of artifacts 
deposited by hunter-gatherers on a surface. Thus, 
easily apparent pattern may be as much the result of 
the presence of interpretable structures as an out-
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growth of a change in the nature of ritual behavior. 
Nevertheless, Bradley's observations help explain 
why the examples discussed in the chapters here are 
largely those of hunter-gatherers rather than more 
sedentary peoples. Because hunter-gatherer groups 
by and large lack permanent structures, the palimp-
sest nature of the archaeological record they create 
is much more apparent and much harder to gloss 
using synchronic narrative. Therefore, archaeolo-
gists, including a number of authors in this volume, 
have to some degree been forced to look for alter-
native types of explanation, particularly forms that 
are less reliant on contemporary social theory. 
In a now classic article, Ingold (1993) discussed 
the relationship between what he termed the "task-
scape" and the landscape. The taskscape consists of 
an interconnected set of tasks, and the landscape 
is an array of related features. But rather than keep 
these as separate entities, Ingold argued that with 
the understanding of the landscape as fundamen-
tally temporal comes the notion that human ac-
tivities must be seen as nested within "the wider 
pattern of activity for all animal life, which in turn 
nests within the pattern of activity for all so-called 
living things, which nests within the life-process of 
the world" (1993:164). This is clearly a call for the 
type of multiscalar explanation advocated by Ra-
menofsky (1998) and Smith (1992.), among others. 
Such explanation, however, has not so far been in-
formed by the "formational metaphysic" discussed 
above. Multiscalar, materialist explanation pro-
vides a unique archaeological view on human his-
tory that is most effective when combined with a 
sophisticated understanding of the time-averaged 
nature of the archaeological record and interpreta-
tions derived from the last 30 years of formational 
studies. As Murray (2.004) indicates, too often ar-
chaeologists have taken the easy "out" and, in the 
face of a palimpsest record, effectively ignored time 
and sought a synchronic, functional explanation 
that denies a historical past. 
The problem is not the lack of formation stud-
ies; although there are no doubt more such stud-
ies that need to be undertaken, the message is clear 
enough that there exist no simple relationships be-
tween the archaeological record and the nature 
of behavior that created this record. Rather, the 
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problem lies in the ease with which the message 
can be dismissed in the search for "higher" social 
explanation (read "lifeway reconstruction," even 
if couched in the guise of, for example, an evolu-
tionary behavioral strategy or the manipulation of 
agents). Formation studies are often acknowledged 
as important, but they are used as a way of remov-
ing the "noise" from patterns that can then be di-
rectly assessed with behavioral or social theory. 
Why are archaeologists so disinterested in time, 
and why have they resisted the implications of the 
formational metaphysic? Paynter (2002) sources 
the problem to a processual archaeology that was 
not concerned with chronology but only with 
documenting change from one steady state to the 
next. Dunnell (1980) makes much the same criti-
cism, noting that the historical explanation favored 
by Binford (1962) at the dawn of the New Archae-
ology quickly came to be replaced by a synchronic 
functionalism. Murray (1987, 1993, 1997), how-
ever, places the problem much earlier, shortly af-
ter the foundation of archaeology as a discipline in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Here, he argues, the 
founding fathers of archaeology were faced with 
the need to develop an explanation for humanity's 
past, greatly extended in time. They chose contem-
porary ethnographic analogy and, with it, essen-
tially timeless synchronic explanation, a temporal 
scale of interpretation that modern archaeology 
has been unable to shed. He argues that rather than 
accept a consensus position on archaeological the-
ory, it is time th~t archaeologists acknowledge the 
antiquity of their own explanatory framework and 
consider a range of alternatives. 
Most archaeologists consider studies of the ar-
chaeological record to be important but tend to 
separate these studies into a methodological cat-
egory, separate from theoretical concerns (e.g., 
Hegmon 2003). From the earliest days of the New 
Archaeology, it was not the archaeological record 
that was thought to limit the types of questions that 
could be addressed but, rather, the ingenuity of the 
archaeologist in deriving ways to interpret this re-
cord. Thus, though the New Archaeology, and par-
ticularly behavioral archaeology, led to a concern 
with how the record formed, with rare exceptions 
(e.g., Plog 1973,1974), the nature of the record was 
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seen as a methodological rather than a theoretical 
challenge. 
Not everyone views the record in this way. Some 
archaeologists, particularly geoarchaeologists, like 
their colleagues in geomorphology, paleontology, 
and ecology, accept that the nature of deposits, ar-
chaeological or otherwise, influences the analyti-
cal and therefore interpretative scales at which the 
past is viewed. The case is most clearly stated among 
paleontologists, where the long time spans and 
range of taphonomic processes combine to limit 
the degree to which fossil deposits may be inter-
preted as the ancient remnants of biological com-
munities (see de Lange, this volume). Paleontologi-
cal deposits are time averaged; they combine within 
a single unit materials that derive from a number of 
potentially unrelated events. The minimum chron-
ological unit used to interpret these events does not 
represent the time span of the events themselves 
but, rather, that of the unit in which they are de-
posited. In many cases this time span will extend 
well beyond that typically associated with observa-
tions of organisms existing together within an eco-
system. In the same way that paleontologists have 
questioned the relationship between fossil popula-
tions and ecological communities, archaeologists 
need to ask whether behavioral observations de-
rived from short-term ethnographic observations 
relate to the long-term and palimpsest nature of 
most archaeological records. 
Numerous authors in this volume deal with de-
flated records where the question of time averag-
ing is made much more obvious through the lack of 
stratigraphy in the conventional sense. With bur-
ied deposits, it may be easier to maintain the fiction 
that material from the same layer was deposited at 
the same time or at least as a result of the same occu-
pation. That this is only very rarely so is increasingly 
apparent as a result of geoarchaeological studies 
that critique not only the simple equation of strati-
graphic changes with changes in occupation type 
but even the cultural association of stratigraphy at 
all (e.g., Stein 2000). 
Palimpsests, rather than living floors, character-
ize the archaeological record of all times and places. 
If an archaeological deposit results from the ac-
tivities of many different peoples who undertook 
, 
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different types of actions that produced artifacts 
through time. and moreover occupied a location 
for variable amounts of time. sometimes leaving 
the place completely. what then do the patterns ap-
parent in the material culture left by these peoples 
mean in a behavioral sense? As Michael Schiffer 
(1972.) noted so long ago. items found associated 
were not necessarily used together. This must intro-
duce an element of difficulty into functional assess-
ments. yet this problem has received relatively little 
discussion (but see Wandsnider 1996). 
Some archaeologists undertake a search for liv-
ing floors. sites where the conditions of burial mean 
that artifacts were deposited within a relatively 
short span of time. in the hope of discovering a re-
cord where Time's Arrow can be effectively ignored 
(surely the ultimate irony for an archaeologist). 
Taken to an extreme. one might imagine a living 
floor representing such a short span of time that no 
artifacts were deposited and no structures formed 
at all, although even such a site. in effect unrecog-
nizable archaeologically. would still not be immune 
from the influence of Time's Arrow (Bailey 2.007). 
For patterns to appear in the archaeological record 
artifacts need to accumulate. Therefore the passage 
of time and the formation of palimpsests as a conse-
quence are the very processes that make the record 
interpretable. Without the accumulation of pa-
limpsest deposits. too few events will have occurred 
to form an,archaeological record. 
Living floors and functionally associated tool 
kits presuppose artifacts manufactured. used. and 
discarded as the result of a Single event. The arti-
facts in such scenarios are manufactured to fulfill 
a single need. Yet such a synchronic view under-
plays the results of research that indicates that all 
artifacts are to some degree the products of com-
plex use-life histories (DeBoer 1974; DeBoer and 
Lathrap 1979). This is most ~learly seen when the 
form of artifacts changes as a result of use. The well-
known tool resharpening studies of Middle Paleo-
lithic scrapers. for instance. indicate that certain 
tool forms. classified on their morphological differ-
ences into distinct types. were in fact the result of 
repeated reworking of the tool edge (Dibble 1984. 
1987). Thus. assemblage composition. measured as 
the proportion of different tool forms. each with 
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a different life history. reflects not the functional 
utility of a group of tools used at one particular 
instant but the outcome of combining many such 
scenarios through time. The pattern resides in the 
palimpsest. not in the functional instant. 
TIME PERSPECTIVISM 
AND THIS VOLUME 
The chapters in this volume provide a variety of ap-
proaches that seek to exploit the palimpsest nature 
of the archaeological record in its various forms. 
Bailey's chapter sets the scene by discussing the 
history of the development of time perspectivism 
and the nature of palimpsests. Subsequent chapters 
deal first with palimpsests of artifacts and features 
found within sites and then with the temporal sig-
nificance of artifact use-life histories. A series of 
chapters relates use-life histories to their geoarchae-
ological situations within a landscape context. and 
a further series uses the same concepts to consider 
assemblage formation. Two final chapters deal first 
with the relationship between ethnoarchaeology 
and time and. second. provide an overview of time 
perspectivism in relation to the present volume. 
Sullivan. in chapter 3. discusses the.types of be-
havioral information that may be inferred as a re-
sult of feature abandonment. but rather than seek 
an interpretation based on a simple dichotomy be-
tween planned and unplanned abandonment. dia-
chronic and synchronic (the equivalent of a living 
floor) assemblage formation. he accepts that all as-
semblages take time to form. What may appear to 
be the simple consequence of different modes of 
abandonment in his house assemblages becomes. 
when the assemblages are viewed as accumulations 
with temporal depth. the result of distinctly differ-
ent seasonal poses practiced by the people who de-
posited these assemblages. His investigation'relies 
on the elaboration of the "trace" concept first intro-
duced by Sullivan in 1978. 
Shott (ch. 4) picks up on the notion of arti-
fact use-life histories to investigate the temporal-
ity of the earliest East African sites. His goal is to 
resolve a debate that pits a time perspectivist view 
of assemblage composition against one based on 
synchronic function. Like Olivier (1999). he is 
able to resolve the impasse by viewing artifacts and 
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assemblages not as the static outcome from man-
ufacturing events but, rather, as the accumulation 
of a series of activities that continuously form and 
reform the archaeological record. As in Sullivan's 
piece, significantly different inferences are possible 
if it is accepted that the archaeological record rep-
resents an accumulation of material through time, 
and explanations are sought that are compatible 
with this accumulative nature. 
Although use-life history may be most appar-
ent in portable artifacts, particularly those manu-
factured in materials like stone where the reductive 
nature of the technology means that much of the se-
quence of reuse episodes is retained on the artifact, 
it is no less important in the morphology of other 
artifact forms and materials. Thus, Olivier (1999) is 
able to show how use-life histories of a variety of ar-
tifact forms found as grave goods in Hallstatt buri-
als inform on the complex temporality of a site type 
once identified as a "closed find," the structural 
equivalent of a living floor. Despite the burials su-
perficially appearing to be the outcome of a burial 
event, Olivier is able to show that the temporality 
of the site is reflected in the different histories of 
grave goods, some from distant sources, some from 
much more restricted geographic locations. Even 
the structure itself shows a history of use beyond 
manufacture for a single event. Evidently, the burial 
chamber was opened at a later time, with material 
added and perhaps some removed. The elegance of 
Olivier's analysis comes from interpreting the sites 
not as the result of temporally discrete events but, 
rather, as the outcome of a series of actions under-
taken through time. 
This alternative reading of the temporality of 
material things forms the basis for three of the chap-
ters in this volume that turn the problem posed by 
surface archaeological sites on its head. The living 
floor ideal is rejected, and the "problem" posed by 
the conflation of artifacts from multiple events is 
turned into an advantage. All three chapters ex-
ploit the life histories of artifact types as a way of 
drawing inferences about the temporality of the re-
cord, albeit from widely differing geographic loca-
tions and therefore different technologies. 
Wandsnider (ch. s) uses a variety of portable 
artifact types as well as structures and geoarchaeo-
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logical approaches to the time periods over which 
deposits were formed to assess the temporality of 
occupation across the Wyoming Basin of inter-
montane North America. Not all sites represent the 
same temporality; some are the product of quite 
short occupation duration and limited reuse of fea-
tures, whereas other locations saw more intense 
reuse over longer periods. If the impact of the pe-
riod over which surfaces were available to accumu-
late material is brought into the mix, it is possible 
to assess the span of time during which occupation 
occurred and the degree to which features were re-
utilized. Developing instruments that permit anal-
ysis of the formational complexity of palimpsests 
offers a landscape archaeology that is not based on 
analogies drawn from a synchronic settlement pat-
tern and not based solely in timeless system time 
(departing from Ebert 1992). 
Relying on geographic information system ma-
nipulations, Dooley (ch. 6) proposes a battery of 
such instruments to help assess the temporality of 
medium- and long-term occupation in the north-
ern North American Great Plains. He is well aware 
that the chronological resolution of his surface as-
semblage is not fine enough to put forward conven-
tional synchronic behavioral interpretations, so he 
has modified his goal to document instead long-
term landscape evolution as a way of addreSSing 
how the humanly created environment attracted or 
deflected past occupation. 
Holdaway, Fanning, and Rhodes (ch. 7) first 
discuss the temporality of the landscape, noting 
that in western New South Wales, Australia, land 
surfaces, and therefore the archaeological record 
they preserve, may differ considerably in age. A 
"dots on maps" approach to the identification of 
settlement patterns, wherein all sites and assem-
blages are treated as part of a coherent whole, is not 
applicable. Rather, like Wandsnider (ch. s), they 
suggest that assemblage formation must be assessed 
in relation to the geomorphological history of the 
surfaces on which the deposits are found. Artifact 
assemblages in turn are not the functional remains 
of moments in time but reflect time accumulations 
over the time periods during which sedimentary 
deposits formed. Assemblage comparison shows 
patterns produced by varying temporal histories of 
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deposition that are not interpretable using conven-
tional functional sets of inferences. 
Three further chapters use geoarchaeological 
concepts combined with considerations of time av-
eraging to look at various aspects of assemblage for-
mation. Stern in chapter 8 makes a detailed case for 
an alternative form of analysis to one based on the 
definition of a set of sequential, stratigraphically 
defined assemblages at different sites. Based on a 
careful geoarchaeological analysis of the formation 
of sedime'rlts in Pleistocene caves from Tasmania, 
she argues for the definition of the equivalent of the 
minimum archaeological stratigraphic unit used in 
the analysis of a paleolandscape (Stern 1993). The 
crucial question for arialysis then becomes the dif-
ferences in assemblage composition that accrue as a 
result of different rates and durations of accumula-
tion, rather than interpretations based on assump-
tions about the functional equivalence of activities 
conducted at different sites. 
De Lange (ch. 9) reviews the results of Bailey's 
Klithi research considering the nature of inferences 
that are drawn from lithic and faunal materials. Her 
critique centers on the relationship between the 
temporality of deposits containing artifact and fau-
nal assemblages and the temporality implied by the 
types of analyses performed. At Klithi, a mismatch 
is apparent in the time-averaged nature of the de-
posits versus short-term explanations framed in 
terms oflithic reduction sequences and prey selec-
tion options. De Lange's solution is to suggest that 
archaeologists follow more closely the approach ad-
opted by paleobiologists, where the time-averaged 
nature of the record is used as the basis for picking 
which analytical techniques are selected and there-
fore what forms of inference can be made. 
One of the outcomes of an essentially syn-
chronic view of the archaeological record is that we 
also tend to look for causation in synchronic terms, 
yet at any moment, action is a product of processes 
beginning in the past and continuing into the fu-
ture (Bailey 2007). This is as true for ethnogra-
phy as it is for archaeology, a point emphasized 
by Arnold in chapter ro. Ethnoarchaeological de-
scriptions should not be seen as timeless vignettes 
but, rather, as having as much relevance to the 
study of change as archaeological data. As Arnold 
II 
states, both ethnographers and archaeologists ef-
fectively view their data at one particular time, the 
intersection of the observer and the observed, and 
processes that affect these data have operated, and 
will continue to operate, both before and after this 
point in time. Ethnoarchaeologists are particularly 
well suited to study some types of change-Arnold 
discusses supplanting/supplementing and intensi-
fication/ extensification-when the temporality of 
the observations can be matched to the temporal-
ity of the explanation. 
A final chapter in the volume, by Tim Murray, 
provides an epilogue extending the background 
to the previous essays by identifying some of the 
questions that remain to be answered as well as the 
themes that are central to all of the chapters. Mur-
ray is interested in the relationships among time, 
the empirical, and the theoretical in archaeology. 
He argues that despite the range of what at face 
value appear to be fundamentally different theo-
retical approaches to contemporary archaeology, 
nearly all maintain the archaeology as anthropol-
ogy metaphysic. Time perspectivism emanating 
from Bailey's 1980s essays has clearly failed to spark 
the archaeological imagination and promulgate an 
alternative to mainstream archaeological theory. 
Murray searches for reasons why time perspectiv-
ism should hold such a peripheral status in relation 
to the, disciplinary cultural norms. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps it is not so surprising that archaeology, 
the discipline that above all others should be con-
cerned with time, is in effect so unconcerned with 
anything to do with time except chronometry. 
Despite much discussion about the need to con-
sider long-scale temporal processes, as the chap-
ters in this volume illustrate, taking time seriously 
and thinking about the archaeological record are 
not straightforward issues. Interpreting what hap-
pened in the past as a reflection of familiar scales of 
behavior is the easy out. Such explanations seem so 
much clearer because they are easy to comprehend, 
but in many cases, probably the majority, these ex-
planations fail because they lack a connection be-
tween the temporal scale at which the record can 
be analyzed and the temporal scale implicit in the 
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explanation. That this is no trivial failure is under-
lined by the virtual ubiquity of palimpsests, in all 
their various forms, in the archaeological record. 
Archaeologists may be able to address a wide range 
of research questions, but not all these questions 
will be applicable to the entire archaeological re-
cord. In addition, the types of explanations gener-
ated will in many cases depart from those familiar 
examples based on short-term lifeways. There are 
two ways to react to this situation: a retreat into 
conventional archaeological explanation or, as au-
thors attempt here, the development of alternate 
ways to describe an archaeologically based past. 
